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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to research whether initial public offerings (IPOs) backed by buyout 
sponsors are able to deliver superior stock performance over non-backed issues. Based on the 
benefits brought by the leveraged buyout model, the information asymmetry issues are likely 
to be mitigated in buyout-backed offerings. This indicates less negative surprises in the 
aftermarket and is expected to reflect on better stock market performance.  
 
I utilize buy-and-hold abnormal returns against three different benchmarks and time periods 
of 12, 24 and 36 months to detect patterns in stock performance between buyout- and non-
backed IPOs. In addition, the causes of performance are studied in multivariate regressions 
to gain insight on which offer-, company-, and owner-specific factors drive the stock’s 
performance. 
 
DATA 
The sample contains 2,021 IPOs listed in the United States between April 1996 and December 
2008. The SDC Platinum’s dataset of buyout-backed offerings is validated by studying their IPO 
prospectuses, identifying 321 issues as buyout-backed ones. Stock price data is obtained from 
Center for Research in Security Prices, and accounting items from Compustat. 
 
RESULTS 
I find strong evidence for buyout-backed offerings outperforming their non-backed peers and the 
S&P 500 benchmark over the first year of trading. Still, the persistence of outperformance does 
not hold consistently for longer time periods or against all benchmarks. 
 
This study shows support for buyout-firm reputation, length of buyout-firm involvement and 
earnings quality to have a significant positive impact on the stock performance of buyout-backed 
offerings. However, I find no evidence on the size of buyout-firm’s ownership share to affect the 
performance. 
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TUTKIMUKSEN TAVOITTEET 
Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää, saavuttavatko pääomasijoittajien tukemat listautumisannit 
muita listautuvia yrityksiä paremman kurssikehityksen. Velkarahoitteisen yritysostomallin (LBO) 
tuomien etujen oletetaan vähentävän informaatioasymmetriaa ja sen tuomia ongelmia 
pääomasijoittajien omistamissa yrityksissä. Vähäisempi informaatioasymmetria tuottaa 
oletuksena vähemmän negatiivisia yllätyksiä listautumisen jälkeen, minkä pitäisi näkyä 
parempana kurssikehityksenä. 
 
Käytän kurssikehityksen mittaamiseen epänormaaleja tuottoja 12, 24 ja 36 kuukauden ajalta 
listautumisen jälkeen, verraten tuottoja kolmeen eri verrokkiin. Lisäksi tutkin 
monimuuttujaregressioiden avulla mitkä anti-, yritys- ja omistajakohtaiset tekijät vaikuttavat 
osakkeen epänormaaliin kurssikehitykseen. 
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TULOKSET 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Private equity (PE) industry1 has become a key player in the global financial markets during the last 
three decades. It serves as a key player in M&A market, provides capital for companies, and also 
bears a large importance in taking companies public through initial public offerings (IPOs). 
Leveraged buyouts2 (LBOs) are an important part of private equity, and differ from the likes of 
venture capital on several dimensions. Typically LBOs are used to acquire majority share in more 
mature, cash flow -steady companies, which are either private or public (usually taken private after 
the transaction). These transactions are financed mostly by third party equity investors, as well as 
high amounts of debt. After several years of financial, operational and governance improvements, 
private equity firms then exit their buyout investments through a sale to other party, or via listing the 
stock for public exchange.  
Long-run stock market performance of initial public offerings continues to be an area of controversy 
in the world of corporate finance, as emphasized in the reviewing study by Ritter and Welch (2002). 
These controversies are amplified on issues backed by a financial sponsors, such as private equity 
firms. Academics have generally seen private equity backing as a quality label for IPOs due to its 
reducing effect on information asymmetries. Several studies (see for example Bergström, 2006, Cao 
and Lerner, 2009, Levis, 2011) show significant positive abnormal performance over non-backed 
issues in both European and American context. However, these findings are challenged by works of 
Rindermann (2004) and Jelic, Saadouni, Wright (2005) who do not document similar performance 
differences between backed and non-backed offerings. 
Buyout industry has also received critique for their short-termism and exploitation of investor 
sentiment through favorable market timing. Cao (2011) suggests that PE sponsors’ ability to create 
value is mostly attributable to successful timing while also the financial press has pointed several 
shortcomings in the value creation of the LBO model. For example, New York Post business reporter 
                                                 
1 Private equity refers to long-term equity and mezzanine investments in private companies, and in this paper the term is 
used to describe the industry as whole, i.e. both venture capital and buyout investing 
2 Leveraged buyouts are a specific type of investments and hence one part of private equity concept. With the focus of 
this paper being on buyouts, I use terms buyout-backed, private equity -backed and LBOs interchangeably when referring 
to IPOs that were previously acquired in a leveraged buyout transaction. 
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Josh Kosman has dedicated an entire book3 discussing the detrimental effect of private equity on the 
American economy, criticizing their short-termism and detrimental effects on employment. 
Buyout-backed IPOs are an interesting topic also from the viewpoint of exit type that the PE firms 
choose for their portfolio companies. Kaplan and Strömberg (2008) portray exit characteristics of 
LBOs over time, and it appears evident that popularity of an IPO exit has decreased. In early 1990’s 
almost a quarter of investments exited via the IPO channel, whereas that ratio has dropped to around 
10 % for the 21st century. Meanwhile, other exit channels such as secondary buyouts (financial 
sponsor selling to another financial sponsor) have increased in popularity. Such development could 
hint towards private equity firms being less confident about the sustainability of their improvements 
post-IPO, and they do not necessarily prefer to continue holding shares in portfolio companies but 
rather prefer a full exit. Still, private equity IPOs remain rather popular and recently constituted for 
one-third of global IPO value in Q1 20124. 
Considering the controversial academic findings, mixed reception among general public, and private 
equity industry’s important presence in M&A and capital markets, I find the buyout-backed IPOs an 
important and interesting topic to study. The possible outperformance to non-backed IPOs is an 
interesting phenomenon in that if buyout-backed issues are able to consistently deliver superior stock 
returns, why are they not priced accordingly? Which drivers cause this outperformance? This study 
examines these performance patterns between buyout-backed and non-backed offerings, and provides 
evidence on which factors drive the performance. 
1.2 Research question and contribution 
The research proposition in my thesis is to study whether IPOs backed by buyout sponsors are capable 
of delivering superior stock performance over non-backed issues. Study is conducted on IPOs listed 
in the United States between April 1996 and December 2008. 
The first objective is to compare the stock market performance of buyout-backed and non-backed 
IPOs for up to 36 months after flotation. The motivation for this research setting comes from the 
characteristics of private equity. The involvement of private equity sponsors before and after the IPO 
should allow continuous improvement of company’s operational performance through better 
governance and management incentives. Also the benefits associated with the LBO model (leverage, 
picking high quality companies for investment) and the implementation of the offering (better 
                                                 
3 The Buyout of America – How Private Equity is destroying jobs and killing the American economy, 2010. 
4 Ernst & Young, http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Newsroom/News-releases/Q1-2012--Europe-saw-the-largest-PE-backed-
IPO-in-18-months 
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reputation leading to high quality underwriters, suitable market timing) motivate the expectation of 
buyout-backed issues to outperform others. In order to answer to this research objective, I utilize buy-
and-hold abnormal returns against three different benchmarks and time periods of 12, 24 and 36 
months to detect patterns in stock performance between buyout- and non-backed IPOs. 
Second main research objective is related to which factors impact the stock market performance in 
case of buyout-backed IPOs. The causes of performance are studied in multivariate regressions to 
gain insight on which offer-, company-, and owner-specific factors drive the stock’s performance. I 
investigate the effect of buyout-sponsors’ ownership share after the offering – larger holding is 
expected to reflect in better stock-market performance due to improved monitoring (Katz, 2009). The 
reputational dimension of the buyout sponsor is also under study, with previous research providing 
support for better-reputational PE firms being able to select high-quality portfolio companies, having 
access to underwriters of better quality, as well as delivering superior governance. Furthermore, I 
examine the impact of LBO duration on the stock performance. Longer time under PE ownership is 
expected to improve the performance due to time allowing more complete value creation in the LBO 
process (Cao, 2011). Finally, the effects of earnings quality on buyout-IPOs performance are 
investigated. Following Katz (2009), better earnings quality associated with private equity sponsors 
should result in fewer negative surprises in the aftermarket, and hence better stock market 
performance. 
I follow the approach taken by Levis (2011) but conduct this research in American setting and for an 
extended time period to reflect on the impact of the recent credit crunch. Methodologically I 
supplement his work by also comparing the IPOs performance to industry-, size- and style-matched 
control firms in order to alleviate the effects of such variables on IPOs performance. Furthermore, 
this research is complemented with several variables omitted by Levis (2011). Private equity owners’ 
reputation and earnings quality of the listing company are both studied as possible drivers of IPOs’ 
aftermarket performance. 
My thesis contributes to current literature by providing an updated view on the performance of 
buyout-backed IPOs in American stock markets. Majority of literature on the performance of PE-
backed issues have related to the involvement of venture capitalists (see for example Brav and 
Gompers, 1997) or a specific type of deals (for example reverse LBOs5 in Cao and Lerner, 2009). 
Buyout-backed offerings are chosen under study due to their unique characteristics of high leverage 
                                                 
5 Reverse LBOs refer to private equity firms purchasing a company off the stock market, and then re-listing it after the 
holding period 
4 
 
utilization and investment choice of struggling, mature companies or divisions. Furthermore, with 
time period of my study extending to include the latest financial crisis – a period of greater uncertainty 
– it will be interesting to see whether the PE sponsors’ good relationships with financial institutions 
have provided some needed flexibility during these financially distressed times. 
Additionally, my thesis provides more clarification on the sources of buyout-backed IPOs’ 
performance. Issue-specific drivers such as underpricing and size are studied, as well as operating 
indicators like asset turnover and leverage. Of most interest are however the buyout-specific 
variables’ (size of an ownership stake, reputation, length of investment and earnings quality) as 
performance drivers, since academic evidence on these factors is still somewhat controversial. For 
example, leverage is shown to improve stock performance in Levis (2011), and Hou and Robinson 
(2006), while Cao and Lerner (2009) do not find evidence for similar relation. 
To sum up, the main research questions of this study are summarized below: 
Q1: Do the buyout-backed IPOs outperform other, non-backed IPOs in terms of 
aftermarket stock performance? 
Q2: Which company-, owner- and offer -specific factors drive the stock market 
performance of buyout-backed IPOs? 
1.3 Main findings 
This study provides evidence for buyout-backed IPOs outperforming their non-backed peers in terms 
of stock market performance in the American stock markets, in support of previous findings by 
Bergström et al. (2006) in France and United Kingdom, Cao and Lerner (2009) in United States, Levis 
(2011) in United Kingdom among others. On average the buyout-backed IPOs delivered buy-and-
hold abnormal returns of 10 percent above the S&P500 benchmark during the first 12 months of 
trading, in comparison to non-backed issues negative 6 percent. Buyout-backed offerings outperform 
the others also for 24- and 36-month terms, but the persistence of generating statistically significant 
abnormal returns over the market benchmark does not apply. Further study of aftermarket 
performance by IPO year shows that buyout-backed IPOs good performance seems not dependent on 
successful market timing, but rather a continuous phenomenon - illustrated by them outperforming 
the S&P500 index ten times out of the studied thirteen years. 
Secondly, this study gives insight on drivers of IPO’s performance. As expected from studies by 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) and Levis (2011), high first-day returns correlate negatively 
with new stock’s development. Likewise, market capitalization and book-to-price are shown to have 
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significant positive impact, which might be due to lower risks associated with such larger and more 
stable companies. Of the operating characteristics, asset turnover surprisingly does not seem to have 
a significant relation to performance, whereas leverage has a positive impact on stock’s development. 
However, this study shows that buyout-backed IPOs operating performance levels (measured in terms 
of asset turnover and operating margin) before the IPO are far superior to non-backed issues, and also 
that they manage to maintain such performance after IPO more persistently.  
In addition to offer-specific variables and operating characteristics, this study also provides evidence 
that both the private equity sponsor’s reputation (measured by assets under management) and length 
of their involvement in the portfolio company drive the aftermarket performance positively. However, 
the size of the private equity ownership stake does not seem to have such significance, contradicting 
with findings by Levis (2011). It might be that PE houses continue active ownership after the actual 
IPO event despite the size of their stake. They still have their reputational concerns, lock-up 
agreements as well as large financial gains associated with the performance of the stock to consider. 
Finally, earnings quality emerges as a relevant positive driver of buyout-IPOs’ performance in this 
study. As Katz (2009) suggests, reputational measures and tighter monitoring employed by PE 
sponsors drives better earnings quality and hence should reflect on lack of negative earnings surprises. 
1.4 Structure of the study 
This thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the private equity industry in general by 
describing their investment process and levers of value creation, as well as taking a look in the 
development of the industry. Section 3 presents the main theories and empirical findings in the fields 
of IPO performance, information asymmetry associated with new stock listing and private equity 
involvement in IPO context. In section 4, the testable hypotheses are derived from the theoretical 
frameworks. Section 5 describes the data retrieval process and its specifications, and presents the 
main methods that are utilized in this study. In section 6 the empirical results are presented and 
analyzed. Finally, section 7 concludes and provides suggestions for future research. 
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2 Private equity industry 
This section presents an introduction to the private equity industry with specific focus on the buyout 
investments. The characteristics of private equity model, including firm and compensation structures, 
exit channels and the private equity value creation levers are described in addition to a brief look on 
the development of the industry. 
2.1 Definitions 
Private equity is often broadly defined to include medium to long-term investments of equity and 
equity-related instruments in non-public companies. The wide range of different types of investments 
range from early stage venture funding and mezzanine financing6 to large leveraged public-to-private 
transactions where a listed company is bought off the public trading. Generally, the private equity 
investments bear low liquidity and transparency, since valuation of private stock is not continuous, 
nor are their disclosure requirements comparable to those of publicly traded corporations. 
Even though there are variations regarding how terms such as venture capital or buyout are used, they 
generally reflect on the stage of development that the portfolio company is in. Private equity could 
be broadly classified to three subcategories: venture capital, growth equity and leveraged buyouts. 
Venture capital (VC) financing is most commonly utilized in rather early stage financing of 
companies with good growth prospects but limited revenue and high risk, such as start-ups. Typical 
for venture capitalists is also that they do not acquire a majority share via their investments but rather 
look for having a broad portfolio of investments to diversify the high risk associated with venture 
capital investments. Growth equity bears similarities to venture capital in that it often targets also 
minority ownership, but investment focus is more towards established companies rather than long-
shot ventures. 
Leveraged buyout transactions are the main focus of this study, and they refer to companies being 
acquired with typically a large debt financing component in addition to relatively small equity 
investment. In these buyout transactions the private equity sponsor(s) often purchase majority 
ownership in the company to be able to exercise control easily over firm’s operations. Targets of 
buyouts are generally large, more mature firms with stable cash flows but some operational issues 
that the buyout firm is looking to turn over. In addition to the majority ownership, a key distinction 
                                                 
6 Mezzanine financing is the term used to describe structures with debt- and equity-like features, such as preferred equity 
or heavily subordinated debt 
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from venture capital is the buyouts’ focus on operational, governance and financial improvements 
instead of VCs’ target of growing new business. 
The buyout transactions can be further classified on the basis of what is the driving force behind the 
transaction. A general distinction is often made between outsider-driven (i.e. private equity fund) 
institutional buyouts (IBOs) and insider-driven management buyouts (MBOs7). However, for the 
purposes of this study the split mentioned above is not required, and I will be referring to all types of 
buyout investments with the term buyout-backed. 
2.2 Private equity model 
This section presents the characteristics of private equity model with specific focus on buyout 
investments. Typical firm and transaction structures are described, as well as presenting the ways in 
which private equity firms create value, how they are compensated and how they exit their 
investments. 
2.2.1 Firm structure 
Private equity firm is typically organized as a partnership or a limited liability corporation (Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2008). Their investment process starts from raising capital through a private equity 
fund that gathers targeted level of financing from institutional investors and wealthy individuals. Most 
often funds are closed-end, meaning that investors cannot withdraw their investments until the fund 
is terminated. The fund is organized around the general partners, i.e. the private equity firm that 
manages the fund, and limited partners who simply provide the capital for investment. General 
partners also provide capital to the fund but often only a small fraction of total commitment. They do 
search for suitable investment targets and engage in active management of the portfolio companies, 
whereas limited partners do not have a say on the investment decisions per se, as long as certain 
covenants are obeyed. Figure 1 below shows an exemplary structure of private equity fund. 
                                                 
7 Management-driven buyouts are further classified into buy-ins and buyouts, depending on whether an outsider 
management team is involved in the investment 
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Figure 1. Typical private equity firm structure 
 
 
The private equity fund that has been raised has typically a lifetime of ten years. First five years are 
generally reserved for the firm to invest the committed capital into companies, whereas the latter five 
with a possible three year extension are focused on exiting the investments and returning the capital 
to investors. In the investment phase the investment opportunities are thoroughly scanned and when 
a potential deal is identified, a capital call is issued for the limited partners to pay for portion of their 
initial commitment. The year when fund starts making investments is called vintage year. 
In the actual buyout transaction, the fund generally forms a new holding company to acquire the 
ownership of identified target. These transactions are generally implemented via three different ways: 
exclusive one-on-one negotiations that are popular mostly on smaller deals, via auctions with multiple 
buyers competing, or by fund-driven tender offers on publicly listed corporations.  
To allow the new holding company acquire the target, the buyout firm often negotiates the debt 
financing raised in the name of the holding company. Use of leverage is by definition rather extensive 
in buyouts, with Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) reporting typical transaction financing to contain 60 
to 90 percent of debt, often including various instruments from senior bank debt to subordinated debt 
with different tranches and mezzanine components. This newly raised debt is backed by the portfolio 
company’s assets and hence the more stable businesses targeted by buyouts are a good match to allow 
for serving the debt in the future. 
Private equity fund
General Partner
Private equity firm
Limited Partners
Investors
Portfolio company 1 Portfolio company 2 Portfolio company 3
Capital and 
management
Capital
Carried interest +  
management fees Capital interest
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2.2.2 Levers of value creation 
After making an investment in the portfolio company, the phase of private equity value creation is 
initiated. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) identify three main areas in which private equity companies 
look to enhance the value of their portfolio company: financial, governance and operational 
engineering. 
Financial engineering is mostly associated with the benefits brought by extensive use of leverage. 
The financial benefits of leverage come from tax deductibility of interest payments, allowing 
reduction in the cost of capital. Secondly, the leverage and related interest payments put more pressure 
on management, mitigating the free cash flow issues presented by Jensen (1986). The boosting impact 
on portfolio company valuation created by leverage has been shown to be significant in study by 
Acharya, Gottschaig, Hahn and Kehoe (2013). They find that 25 to 35 percent of average deal internal 
rate of return come from effects of financial leverage among large private equity deals in the United 
Kingdom. 
Governance engineering refers to activities taken by the private equity sponsor to allow efficient 
monitoring and reducing agency problems through that. Governance engineering is enforced through 
active ownership associated with private equity companies. Firstly, Cornelli and Karakas (2008) 
document that portfolio companies’ Board of Directors are smaller and meet more frequently than for 
comparable public corporations. Second part of active ownership is associated with private equity’s 
rapid actions when in need of a turnaround. Acharya et al. (2013) show that one third of portfolio 
companies CEOs are replaced during the first 100 days. 
Another key mechanism in reducing the need for monitoring are the management incentives. In 
addition to often requiring management to invest their personal wealth in corresponding portfolio 
company, stock- and option-based compensation schemes yield large equity upside for management 
teams. Kaplan’s (1989) findings demonstrate that management ownership is four-fold in transfers 
from public to private ownership. A more recent update by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) supports 
this by showing an average of 16 % equity upside for management of U.S. -based LBOs. This way 
management’s intent can be well aligned with that of owners. Furthermore, with private equity 
company’s stock being illiquid, the usual issues of manipulating short-term performance can be 
mitigated. 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) note that private equity value creation was mainly driven by financial 
and governance engineering in the 1980s, whereas the operational engineering is a more recent 
phenomenon. Operational engineering refers to adding value by leveraging industrial and operating 
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expertise for improvements in portfolio companies, and as a result of which several PE houses are 
organized around a clear industry focus. This also means that private equity houses need to make 
large investments prior to buyout transaction in terms of due diligence and strategic planning.  
2.2.3 Compensation  
Private equity firms are compensated in three ways, containing fixed element as well as performance-
based variable components. Firstly, the general partner earns a fixed annual management fee 
reflecting on the management of private equity fund. This compensation is generally a fixed 
percentage of committed capital, and as investments are realized a percentage of capital employed, 
but also variable percentages and other calculation methods are used for defining the management 
fee in fund contracts. Metrick and Yasuda (2010) provide detailed insight on the fee structures, and 
also document that around two thirds of private equity firms’ expected revenue come from this fixed 
source. 
Main variable component of PE earnings come from share of fund’s profits, called the carried interest. 
The industry standard of 20 percent carried interest appears to be used constantly in the study of 144 
buyout funds by Metrick and Yasuda, 2010. However, definitions vary across partnership contracts, 
in regards to how are the profits measured, what performance level must the fund exceed and when 
are the profits distributed. Other variable components in private equity firms’ compensation include 
transaction and monitoring fees, both being dependent on company size and performance. 
Transaction or deal fees are charged in a similar fashion to M&A advisory services, when company 
is sold or bought. Monitoring fees are associated with the active ownership of portfolio companies, 
and are often charged on basis of a certain percent of EBITDA. 
2.2.4 Exit channels 
Exiting in private equity context refers to transfer of portfolio company ownership. With funds having 
a limited lifetime, the capital invested must be returned to limited partners within time. Furthermore, 
successful portfolio company exits bring financial returns to the fund investors, as well as for general 
partner in terms of carried interest. 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) document exit types for a worldwide sample of 17,000 LBOs between 
1970 and 2007. Patterns in development of different exit channels are presented in Figure 2. Sale of 
a portfolio company to a strategic8 buyer appears most popular with a 38 percent share of the exits. 
The second popular exit vehicle is secondary buyout, sale to another private equity fund or another 
                                                 
8 strategic buyer refers simply to a non-financial institution in this case 
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financial sponsor. This exit type is characterized in 24 percent of the studied LBOs, and has been 
gaining in popularity in 2000s. Initial public offerings are the third main exit channel for private 
equity portfolio companies, accounting for 14 percent of exits. Interestingly, this exit channel that is 
also the focus of this study, has decreased in importance since mid-1990s, amounting to one quarter 
of exit volume previously. 
Figure 2. Share of private equity portfolio company exits 
 
As buyout transactions employ a high level of debt to benefit from financial engineering, it might be 
expected that a large fraction of portfolio investments would result in bankruptcy. However, data 
gathered by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) shows that only 6 percent of deals have faced such 
situation. Assuming a six year holding period on average, the annual default rate of 1.2 % appears 
below that of average for all U.S corporate bond issuers between 1980 and 2002. (Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2009).  
2.3 The U.S. private equity industry 
Leveraged buyouts started to emerge as significant phenomenon in early 1980s, with growth being 
initiated in United States, and later on followed by United Kingdom and rest of Europe. According 
to review by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), 87 % of buyout transactions took place in North America 
in late 1980s. Europe started to catch up quickly in the 1990s, eventually exceeding North America 
in early 2000s with a 49 % share of the global volume. Overall, the global private equity deal values 
amounted to some 200 billion USD in 20129. Spurred by the attractive returns, also fund commitments 
                                                 
9 http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Industries/Private-Equity/Global-PE-Watch-2013---Challenges-and-opportunities 
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have risen greatly in United States from 0.2 billion in 1980 to above 200 billion of late 2000s (Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2009). 
This growth pattern in buyout industry has not been a continuous improvement but rather a quite 
cyclical development, both in terms of deal activity and fundraising. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) 
suggest the pro-cyclicality be driven by credit market conditions: easy access to leverage leads to 
more buyout transactions and higher leverage ratios. Consequently, meeting the debt payments for 
high leverage during a downturn might be troublesome for the portfolio companies. Furthermore, 
with high market sentiment company valuations are inflated as well, making it difficult to employ 
value creation and exit profitably.  
Table 1 below illustrates the impact of credit crunch on global private equity industry. The amount 
of funds, committed capital, deal volumes and values, amount of leverage and IPO exit volume are 
all decreasing after the peak years of 2007-2008. 
 
Table 1. Global PE industry development  
This table illustrates key private equity industry statistics globally. Data has been retrieved from Ernst & Young’s 
Global Private Equity watch report 2013. 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Funds closed 1,073 1,024 638 590 603 589 
Committed capital (US$ b) 611 631 285 253 257 282 
Announced deals 3,349 2,680 1,847 2,265 2,306 2,233 
Announced deal value (US$ b) 734 219 138 240 223 206 
Average leverage 69 % 61 % 54 % 59 % 62 % 62 % 
PE-backed IPOs (US$ b) 58 11 17 35 39 22 
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3 Related literature 
My thesis is related to performance of IPO stocks in general, with specific emphasis on the effects of 
private equity ownership in such issues. This section presents the main theories and key findings 
among underpricing, IPO aftermarket performance, the role of concentrated ownership, and 
implications of private equity involvement.  
3.1 Stock market performance of IPOs 
Studies on IPOs in general have shown the issues to provide significant abnormal returns on the first 
trading day (see for example Ibbotson, 1975) while subsequent stock price development of these 
issues has been inferior in the aftermarket (see for example Ritter, 1991). In their reviewing paper on 
IPO-related matters, Ritter and Welch (2002) state that the long-run performance of IPOs is one the 
most controversial and broadly-studied areas of finance research. 
3.1.1 Underpricing 
Underpricing in IPO context describes the regular phenomenon of stock appreciation from its offer 
price to the closing of first trading day. Research by Ritter and Welch (2002) documents average 
underpricing of 18.8 % in the United States’ sample of 6,249 IPOs between 1980 and 2001, with 
approximately 70 % of the IPOs ending first day of trading above offer price. Other global data points 
document underpricing levels of 24 % in Germany, 11 % in France, 16 % in United Kingdom and 
137 % in China to name a few (see Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist, 1994 for more evidence).   
Ritter and Welch (2002) conclude that first day returns for operating companies are on average 
positive in all countries. Authors argue that these large positive first day returns cannot be justified 
by previously studied motivations, such as risk premiums related to new offerings or simple market 
misevaluation. They suggest that underpricing phenomenon is more derived from the offer price 
setting, i.e. the underwriter-driven process of matching supply and demand. 
Underpricing theories can be divided into two on the assumptions of information asymmetry. In the 
presence of issuer being better informed than investors, there is a fear for a lemons problem similar 
to the one proposed by Akerlof (1970). Due to this uncertainty-related problem only companies with 
lower-than-average quality would be willing to sell their stock at average price. In order to distinguish 
from low-quality issuers, high-quality companies may try to signal their class by offering stock below 
its value. This is suggested to stop low-quality companies from imitating since they are unwilling to 
offer stock below its value, and perhaps reveal their true quality voluntarily. Furthermore, this initial 
sacrifice of underpricing could then be compensated in benefits such as future issuing activity. Welch 
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(1989) for example shows that companies doing an IPO are seeking for a multi-issue strategy with 
future seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in sight. After firm’s true quality has been discovered at the 
market after IPO, the higher pricing at the SEO is well justified to compensate for the uncertainty-
driven initial underpricing. 
In the case of investors being better informed, the underpricing can be explained as a necessity for 
demand to exist – rational investors would not be willing to participate in offerings unless they were 
offered at discount to their valuations. Perhaps more realistic versions of this theory assume that 
investors are differently informed. In this setting underpricing is required to compensate for 
uninformed investors’ fears of winner’s curse, i.e. getting full allocation of overpriced offerings while 
receiving poor allocation in underpriced ones. 
Other suggested reasons for the underpricing phenomenon are related to share allocation in IPOs and 
the bookbuilding process. For example, Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue that underpricing is set by 
the conflict of interest between issuers and underwriters. This suggests that underwriters would 
engage in more severe underpricing than necessary as a reward for their buy-side clients for future 
business. Authors justify the issuers’ acceptance of this by applying the prospect theory initiated by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). According to this issuers are tolerant to the more severe underpricing 
due to the great increase in wealth brought by a successful IPO.  
3.1.2 Aftermarket performance 
There is a broad collection of studies that show evidence for recent listings performing poorly in 
comparison to various benchmarks. Ritter (1991) shows that investing in IPO stocks would have 
resulted in 17 percent less wealth in comparison to investing in a group of size- and industry matched 
firms in the New York Stock Exchange. Similarly Loughran and Ritter (1995) study American IPOs 
and SEOs between 1970 and 1990, finding that their average annual returns over a five-year holding 
period are less than half of returns generated by non-issuing companies. Also Carter, Dark and Singh 
(1998) document similar underperformance for all new listing companies. 
Brav and Gompers (1997) study U.S. companies that went public between 1972 and 1992, and show 
that such underperformance is not unique to companies issuing equity. They find similarly poor 
performance from companies that are of similar size and book-to-market valuation, and that have not 
issued equity. Authors suggest that underperformance is not an IPO effect but rather related to other 
firm characteristics. Ritter and Welch (2002) provide support for this view that poor long-term 
performance extends beyond just IPOs. As IPO companies are often small growth companies, their 
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underperformance appears rather normal when taking into account that such companies have been 
the worst-performing style category of recent decades. 
With conflicting findings on the matter, this poor performance has not yet been universally explained, 
as one would expect IPO stocks to trade alike any other stock post-issue. Despite evidence on certain 
firm characteristics driving underperformance, the presence of efficient markets should suggest that 
such stocks are priced accordingly to match risk and return.  
Finance literature offers several plausible explanations for the IPO underperformance. Firstly, Miller 
(1977) argues that since new issues are associated with a considerable amount of uncertainty, the 
valuation opinions regarding the issuing firm also appear rather divergent. With only the more 
optimistic investors participating in this specific issue, the expectations are inflated on average, i.e. 
the price is set by the minority of investors believing in the issuing firm. Over time as the issuing firm 
proves its “track record” the variance in expectations reduces and drifts more towards the mean 
valuation, resulting in a fall in stock price. 
Second key reasoning for the underperformance is derived from management behavior both pre- and 
post-IPO. Teoh et al. (1998) show that companies associated with most aggressive and optimistic 
earnings management underperformed other issuers by some 20 percent over three years after stock 
listing. Such window-dressing is then reflected in poor stock market performance should the goals 
based on prospectus forecasts not be achieved. Secondly, as suggested by Heaton (2002) manager 
overoptimism combined with a good availability of funds (as is often the case after a stock offering) 
could show signs of overinvestment problem, i.e. management engaging in negative-NPV projects 
that destroy shareholder value. 
The optimism around IPOs is not restricted to just the management but rather for the whole stock 
market. Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) measure companies’ intrinsic valuation via industry-
matched sales and EBITDA multiples. Authors find that IPO firms are priced 50 % above 
comparables at the listing, and that this overpricing against peers helps predict long-run 
underperformance. 
Timing of the offering is one suggested factor impacting the performance of IPOs. Schultz (2003) 
proposes that a “hot” period of IPOs follows a period of successful IPOs, i.e. more and more 
companies will seek listing in a rising market. This results in more offerings taking place at peak 
valuations, as well as the average quality of IPO firms being poorer since during market upturn it is 
easier to go public. Author refers to this as pseudo market timing – issuing companies deliberately 
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try to utilize favorable pricing and positive investor sentiment but they are not aware prices are 
peaking when they issue stock. Consequently when IPO performance studies contain relatively more 
of these poorer quality companies, the underperformance on average occurs. However, this 
explanation is challenged by the works of Helwege and Liang (2004), who research companies both 
in hot and cold IPO markets between 1982 and 1993. They find no major differences in firm 
composition between hot and cold markets but rather that they are of similar size and come from 
largely the same industries. 
3.2 Private equity ownership in mitigating information asymmetry 
Majority of IPO-related literature tackles with the issue of information asymmetry, i.e. when parties 
to the offering bear different levels of information on the flotation process, company itself, as well as 
the stock market situation. Concentrated ownership with good reputation, such as the one provided 
by private equity firms, has been shown to effectively reduce these problems arising from the 
asymmetric information. 
3.2.1 Agency theory 
The principal-agency problem in company context was initially derived by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), who state that agency costs incur in a relationship, in which one person, “the agent”, makes 
decisions on behalf of the other, “the principal”. The costs arise from different objectives of these 
players. For example, with owners’ objectives generally being increase in firm value, the management 
might pursue empire building or other value-destroying measures to increase their personal utility.  
Owner can mitigate these agency costs through closer monitoring, and better contracts such as 
management incentives set to pay on performance. However, for a pack of owners with only minority 
holdings these measures come costly to implement, and may create further agency problems, such as 
the free-rider problem, between the owners. Concentrated ownership should help mitigating the issue 
in theory. As Roe (2004) discusses, in a setting with concentrated shareholding the monitoring 
becomes more beneficial in reducing managerial misbehavior by setting governance accordingly. 
However, this might induce further agency problems, especially in the case of private equity firms. 
The interesting profit-sharing model introduced in section 2.2.3 creates further principal-agent 
relationships between the general and limited partners, as well as the management of the portfolio 
company – all of which might have differences in their objectives. For example, whereas general and 
limited partners mainly aim to benefit from the investment financially, management must also 
consider their personal reputation and continuation at the portfolio company after the sponsors have 
realized their investments.   
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However, it can be argued that with the reputational capital of Private Equity firms in play (Cao and 
Lerner, 2009), these issues are mitigated to large extent. In addition to the financial gains, it is in the 
best interest of PE sponsors to operate towards satisfying all stakeholders in order to guarantee 
successful business for the future as well. 
3.2.2 Adverse selection 
Akerlof (1970) presents the issue of adverse selection in the context of used car markets. He presents 
that since the product quality at the market is unknown, participants face the fear of purchasing a 
“lemon”, i.e. a poor quality product, and as a response request a discount for participation in the 
market. This consequently leads to high quality products being absent from the market, i.e. the market 
being filled with poor quality. Similar reasoning can be derived to the IPO markets, a case in which 
insiders are seen as not disclosing all information regarding the company. On the contrary, they would 
try to benefit on lifting the company valuation by earnings management and unrealistic, optimistic 
performance forecasts (Teoh, 1998). 
Within adverse selection problem, signaling theory has been suggested as a tool in mitigating the 
information asymmetry issues. Insiders provide a signal in the form of disclosing further pieces of 
information to the uninformed parties. In the case of IPOs, underpricing is often interpreted as such 
signal mitigating the information asymmetry. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) propose that underpricing 
works as credible signal of firm quality since only good companies can recoup this initial loss after 
their performance is realized in the stock market, whereas poor-quality companies cannot afford to 
do so. 
In addition to underpricing, firm quality can be signaled by reputational means. In such cases adverse 
selection problem can be mitigated by a certification role taken by the underwriter in charge of the 
issue, or by the owner(s) taking the company public. Underwriter’s role in the IPO process is crucial 
– they work as the middlemen in warranting that offer price reflects the inside information and hence 
providing fairly priced equity to the market. Carter and Manaster (1990) find that prestigious 
underwriters only work with IPOs that are associated with lower information asymmetry, and hence 
better quality, to maintain their reputation. This is supported by the study of Carter et al. (1998) who 
show that the certification brought by high-quality underwriters also translates into better long-term 
stock performance. 
The certification role of the owners is also derived from reputational issues. Since private equity firms 
exit their investments through IPOs on a regular basis, they have their reputation to protect in the 
process. Their need to be able to take their portfolio companies public in the future provides a quality 
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stamp on the issue – they cannot be associated with failures since investors would not be willing to 
participate in their IPO exits further. Also, successful IPO exits could make it easier for PE funds to 
raise money from investors. Gompers (1996) stresses the importance of this reputation building in his 
work on venture capital IPOs. 
3.3 Private equity involvement in IPO context 
Private equity firms are a good example of an active, concentrated owner presented in section 3.2. 
Their role as a concentrated owner, along with beneficial use of leverage should allow better 
monitoring and governance in companies also after their IPO, translating into better performance over 
long-term. In practice, these benefits are achieved by the PE sponsor setting a high quality 
management team and appropriate incentives for them, reducing agency problems in intra-firm 
setting, while also pulling several strategic and operational changes needed to improve accounting 
performance. Still, this area of private equity involvement is very controversial with several academic 
findings suggesting differing views. This section provides the contrasting findings on the performance 
of private equity -backed IPOs, as well as proposing several theories on sources of superior 
performance. 
3.3.1 Aftermarket performance of private equity -backed IPOs 
The studies regarding aftermarket performance and the different types of owner-backing show some 
interestingly contrasting views. Many studies have shown that LBO- and venture capital -backed 
offerings seem to provide superior stock performance in comparison to non-backed issues. However, 
several papers are also more supportive of efficient markets hypothesis in that they document no 
evidence in performance between different types of IPOs. 
In a recent study on the London Stock Exchange, Levis (2011) finds that IPOs with private equity -
backing achieve significantly positive abnormal returns in comparison to venture capital -backed and 
non-backed issues. Outperformance in comparison to other IPOs is also documented in a study by 
Bergström et al. (2006), focused on PE-backed IPOs in London and Paris. However, their sample of 
PE-backed IPOs still generated significantly negative abnormal returns in comparison to overall stock 
market benchmarks. In a somewhat differing fashion, Cao and Lerner (2009) document US-based 
reverse leveraged buyouts to outperform both other IPOs as well as the S&P500 market index. 
Differing views to the superior performance of PE-backed IPOs are offered by Rindermann (2004). 
He does not find evidence on PE-backed issues in general outperforming non-backed ones in France, 
Germany or United Kingdom, but rather only a subgroup of international venture capitalists 
succeeding to spur the aftermarket performance of their portfolio companies. Consequently, venture 
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backing does not seem to have an impact in aftermarket performance of management buyout –based 
IPOs. Jelic et al. (2005) compare those to both non-backed issuers and matching firms in the United 
Kingdom, and document no significant performance differences. Some studies on the United States’ 
LBO market also provide no evidence on the superiority of PE-backed issues. Holthausen and Larcker 
(1996) find no evidence of American RLBOs being associated with abnormal IPO performance, even 
though their accounting performance continues to outperform industry peers. More recently, Cao 
(2011) documents that a subgroup of backed offerings, so called “quick flips”, in which  portfolio 
companies are floated too quickly, underperform and show greater bankrupt probability.  
3.3.2 Sources of outperformance 
Despite lack of general consensus among academics on the aftermarket performance of private equity 
-backed IPOs, studies have found support for several owner and market specific drivers of these 
outperforming IPO stocks. These stem from the benefits of the LBO model (winner selecting, 
leverage, continuing involvement in governance) but also from market timing. 
Jensen’s (1989) work on value drivers of private equity model suggest that superb operational 
performance is achieved through closer monitoring, management expertise and high leverage. 
Generally it is expected that this value is added when company is under private control. However, as 
Levis (2011) argues one could expect these monitoring and management practices to be continuously 
utilized also after PE house’s (partial) IPO exit. This is justified by the major impact of private equity 
in the actual IPO process, being generally active in setting the terms, timing and structure of the 
offering. Furthermore, lock-up agreements and liquidity considerations generally result in financial 
sponsors retaining a significant holding post-IPO as well, implying that it is in their interest to 
continue active engagement with the portfolio company after the IPO. 
Companies receiving investment from buyout sponsors have generally gone through a very thorough 
screening process of firm quality and especially potential. Naturally there are failures associated with 
buyout investments but in general it signals of good firm quality for it to have proceeded into IPO 
process. This is especially the case for more reputable financial sponsors: the more experienced 
players with the largest funds that continue to outperform their competitors. Krishnan et al. (2011) 
show that more reputable venture capitalists are associated with superior long-term performance in 
American IPOs for 1993-2004. This stems from their better ability to pick high-quality firms for 
investment and should be equally adaptable in the context of buyout firms. Better reputation of PE 
sponsors is also associated with better relationships with financial institutions. Concerning this, Brav 
and Gompers (1997) suggest that better-reputational venture capitalists could alleviate the 
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information asymmetry issues and gain in better stock performance through their access to top-tier 
underwriters for the IPO.  
The reputational measures are also related to better monitoring. Financial sponsors with better 
reputation are engaging in more active corporate governance also post-issue and hence are associated 
with better long-term performance in comparison to non-backed issues in the U.S. (Krishnan et al., 
2011). These findings would suggest that sponsor’s measures in operational and governance 
engineering continue to be value-adding also after the issue. This is especially the case in companies, 
in which buyout sponsors hold a majority interest. Katz (2009) finds in his study on American IPOs 
that stock market performance of firms majority-held by private equity sponsors is significantly better 
than that of minority-held or management-owned companies, mainly due to their higher earnings 
quality. 
Related to the better governance engineering are Katz’s (2009) suggestions on buyout-backed 
companies having better earnings quality both prior to and after an IPO. He hypothesizes that tighter 
monitoring employed by PE firms gives management much less leeway to manage earnings upwards. 
Also in the case of LBOs the presence of demanding debtholders results in more timely loss 
recognition for the portfolio company. Overall, these principles ought to result in better, more realistic 
financial reporting quality and make the buyout-backed IPOs differ positively from generally upward-
biased forecasts that are associated with IPOs of small growth companies. 
Financial engineering, i.e. leverage is a descriptive element in buyout-backed companies but the 
empirical evidence regarding its relation to stock performance is rather mixed. The studies by Levis 
(2011) on British non-backed and sponsor-backed IPOs show that leverage is a significant positive 
contributor for the success of PE-backed issues. This is in line with the PE value creation mechanisms 
suggested initially by Jensen (1989), and also supported by empirical findings on American stocks 
by Hou and Robinson (2006). However, in the study on RLBO performance by Cao and Lerner (2009) 
they do not find such significant relation between leverage and buyout-backed IPOs aftermarket 
performance. Consequently Korteweg’s (2010) research on net benefits of leverage proves 
advantages of debt to be decreasing but only when leverage is high.  
Cao (2011) finds evidence on IPOs with shorter PE-sponsor involvement facing larger decreases in 
operating performance than issues with longer duration. Additionally, he shows that there is a certain 
relation between sponsor involvement pre-IPO and market timing. Under poor market conditions 
sponsors spend more time on making the issue a success while that does not matter so much when 
the market conditions are favorable. Bergström et al. (2006) also note that private equity firms do not 
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seem to actively take advantage of windows of opportunity presented by hot IPO markets. Authors 
rationalize this by characterizing PE-backed IPOs as less subject to investor sentiment. With such 
issues being allocated mainly to institutional investors rather than more sentimental retail investors, 
PE firms are less dependent on successful market conditions in exiting through IPO. This way the 
market peaks with overly-inflated equity prices and consequently future growth expectations can be 
better avoided, and the IPO valuations should match the intrinsic stock valuation better. 
4 Hypotheses 
This section presents my hypotheses and the related justifications behind the choice of them. 
Hypotheses are presented in two main parts, derived from the following research questions: 
Q1: Do the buyout-backed IPOs outperform other, non-backed IPOs in terms of 
aftermarket stock performance? 
Q2: Which company-, owner- and offer -specific factors drive the stock market 
performance of buyout-backed IPOs? 
4.1 Outperformance 
In comparison to non-backed IPOs the buyout-backed ones bear several advantages which might 
result in better aftermarket performance. Average IPO stocks have generally been rather small growth 
companies, which are associated with high levels of information asymmetry. This information 
asymmetry issue can be more alleviated by upwards earnings management and too optimistic IPO 
prospectus forecasts. Such exploitation of investor sentiment by the management of non-backed 
offerings could be associated with more severe mispricing, and generally followed by poorer 
performance in the aftermarket for not meeting the inflated expectations. With the private equity 
quality stamp mitigating the information asymmetry problem, PE-backed IPOs should be priced 
closer to the intrinsic value of the stock. Based on these differences it appears natural that there would 
be more negative surprises associated with the non-backed offers capitalizing on the information 
asymmetry. 
With concentrated ownership from financial sponsors specializing in management of companies this 
asymmetry issue can be mitigated. First of all, being repetitive players in IPO markets, PE sponsors 
have their reputation at stake with each offering, and should hence benefit in the long-term on 
providing more honest information on the floating company, effectively reducing the information 
asymmetry on the issue (Cao and Lerner, 2009). Secondly, the better earning quality as evidenced by 
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Katz (2009) further improves the information available on buyout-backed IPOs. This should show 
over time in better meeting performance expectations, and consequently more favorable share price 
reactions. 
Additionally, it can be argued that private equity value creation does not end at the partial IPO exit 
but rather that their efficient management structures (governance, executive compensation, 
relationships with financial institutions) are continuously developed for the benefit of the company. 
Levis (2011) for example justifies the PE-backed IPO outperformance on investors being surprised 
by the continuous involvement of private equity sponsors. Initially, aggressive offer pricing and risks 
related to high leverage result in such issues starting to trade at modest first-day returns. However, 
the continuing involvement of PE sponsors provides robust operational performance to continue after 
flotation, while high debt levels are rapidly reduced after IPO. These features should result in upward 
revision in investors’ valuation. Consequently, my first hypothesis predicts IPOs backed by a buyout 
sponsor to have a better stock market performance than non-backed IPOs. 
H1: Buyout-backed IPOs experience superior aftermarket performance in comparison 
to other, non-backed IPOs. 
4.2 Drivers of performance 
Regular performance drivers affecting IPOs’ stock market performance can be classified into issue-
specific drivers such company size, style (growth vs. value), level of underpricing and market timing, 
as well as operational characteristics like asset turnover, operating margin or leverage ratio. Focus of 
this study is on the private equity -related drivers, with sponsors’ ownership, reputation and length of 
ownership hypothesized to bear an impact on IPOs’ aftermarket performance. Furthermore, also the 
better earnings quality associated with buyout involvement is studied as a driver. 
The size of financial sponsors’ ownership share can be seen as a driver of corporate performance. 
Sponsor that retains a significant amount of ownership for years after the (partial) IPO exit, can 
continue to employ the several benefits brought by the concentrated ownership and the buyout model 
(monitoring, operational and financial governance), that would reflect in better corporate 
performance, both operationally and stock-market-wise. Hence, the second hypothesis predicts that 
companies, in which buyout firms retain a significant ownership post-IPO fare better in the stock 
market: 
H2: Size of buyout-firm ownership post-IPO has a positive effect on stock’s 
performance. 
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I also predict reputation to play a role in the performance of newly-listed stocks. Buyout-sponsors are 
assumed to have similar skill set to venture capitalists in selecting quality firms for investment and 
especially being able to deliver the more active governance over the investment period (Krishnan et 
al., 2011). Additionally, Brav and Gompers (1997) propose that more reputational venture capitalists 
have better access to high-quality underwriters that should alleviate the information asymmetry 
problem and result in better performance than non-backed offerings. These academic findings provide 
justification for the third hypothesis: 
H3: Buyout-firm reputation has a positive effect on stock’s performance. 
As Cao’s (2011) studies on LBOs show, buyouts with shorter sponsor involvement face larger 
decreases in operating performance post-IPO than issues with longer duration. This is simply due to 
large restructurings taking time to accomplish via leveraging all the private equity value creations 
levers optimally. Cao (2011) also shows that buyout-backed IPOs are more rushed under favorable 
market conditions. This can be expected to result in worse stock-market performance due to 
companies being unable to meet the inflated expectations set during hot market period and hence not 
being able to justify their high initial pricing levels. Derived from these findings, I propose the 
following fourth hypothesis: 
H4: Length of buyout-firm involvement pre-IPO has a positive effect on stock’s 
performance. 
In line with Katz’s (2009) findings on earnings quality, I predict better earnings quality to drive IPO 
stock’s performance in the aftermarket. The rationale behind better earnings quality is driven by 
sponsors’ tighter monitoring and reputational concerns, with the active involvement of PE sponsors 
leading in more conservative earnings management and more timely loss recognition. These are both 
indicators of better earnings quality, which in turn should result in fewer negative surprises after the 
IPO, and hence to better stock performance. The hypothesis regarding to earnings quality stands as 
follows: 
H5: Better earnings quality associated with buyout-backed IPOs has a positive effect on 
stock’s performance.  
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5 Data and methodology 
This section describes the specifications on how the sample is formed from different data sources, as 
well as what measures are taken to verify its quality. Additionally, the methodological choices needed 
to test the hypotheses accordingly are presented and justified in this section.  
5.1 Sample selection 
My thesis utilizes a sample of 2021 IPOs listed in three U.S.-based stock exchanges, namely 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq, between April 
1996 to December 2008. The time period is chosen as to allow the study of three-year aftermarket 
performance of the more recent IPOs, as well as taking into account Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s EDGAR database limitations, containing IPO prospectuses starting from April 1996. 
Sample is acquired from four main sources. SDC Platinum’s event data forms the cornerstone of the 
IPO sample. Related stock market data items are obtained from The Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP), while company-specific accounting data is retrieved from Compustat database. These 
data sources are complemented by companies’ prospectus filings in Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s EDGAR database. The whole sample selection process is illustrated in the table 2 
below, with descriptions in following sections. 
Table 2. Sample selection process 
This table explains how the final sample for buyout-backed and non-backed IPOs has been formed via verifying IPOs as 
buyout-backed offerings, and taking data availability into account. 
  
Sample selection criteria: Buyout-backed IPOs No. of obs. Source 
Initial sample of buyout-backed IPOs implemented between April 
1996 and December 2008 in AMEX, NYSE and NASDAQ 
346 SDC Platinum /  
VentureXpert 
Deduct 14 unit issues or Bancshares that are not comparable 
ownership-wise 
332 EDGAR 
Deduct 11 issues with no sign of major private equity involvement 321 EDGAR 
Final BO-sample 321  
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Sample selection criteria: Other IPOs No. of obs. Source 
Initial sample of IPOs implemented between April 1996 and December 
2008 in AMEX, NYSE and NASDAQ 
4002 SDC Platinum / Global 
New Issues 
Deduct 996 issues that appear as duplicate 3006 SDC Platinum  
Deduct 510 issues with CRSP ticker missing 2496 CRSP 
Deduct 475 issues with CRSP codes other than 10 or 11 to remove funds 
and trusts from the sample 
2021 CRSP 
Deduct the 321 issues that are included in the Buyout-backed sample 1700 SDC Platinum / 
VentureXpert 
Final Other IPOs sample 1700  
5.1.1 Event data – buyout-backed IPOs 
SDC Platinum’s VentureXpert database provides a broad amount of data on American private equity 
industry. It offers specific listings of IPOs that have been backed by different kind of financial 
sponsors. In the context of this study, focus is to select all buyout-backed public companies that have 
been listed in Nasdaq, NYSE or AMEX between April 1st 1996 and December 31st 2008. Offer-
specific data such as IPO dates, offer price, issuer CUSIP10 and SIC codes11 were retrieved from SDC. 
Furthermore, in order to form certain owner-related variables, I also obtained the names of private 
equity firms/funds that had invested in the listing company, the PE firms’ capital under management 
and the investment dates to the portfolio companies in the buyout-IPO sample. These specifications 
yield an initial sample of 346 issues that were backed by buyout sponsor. 
This initial sample needs verification measures in order to be better representative of the private 
equity involvement. For the purposes of this study, buyout-backed IPO is defined as company where 
the financial sponsor(s) have a major ownership stake of more than 10 percent prior to offering, and 
at least one of the sponsors is engaging in buyout activities. The ownership stakes and key owners 
listed in prospectuses were examined to verify the magnitude and type of investment in terms of each 
IPO.  
Firstly, from the SDC’s Global New Issues database all IPOs with PE-backing ticker for the 
corresponding time period are studied to see if some relevant issues are missing from the 
                                                 
10 CUSIP (Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures) is a 9-character alphanumeric code which identifies 
a North American financial security 
11 SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) refers to four-digit coding used to classify industries that companies operate in 
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VentureXpert sample. 15 additional IPOs not contained in Venture Xpert data are flagged as PE-
backed, but study of their IPO prospectuses show no sign of major private equity involvement. 
Secondly, offerings in the sample are then further studied by going through IPO prospectuses to verify 
the timing and nature of private equity investment. 11 issues in the sample are removed due to lack 
of private equity involvement. Also, unit issues and Bancshares are excluded on the basis of not being 
comparative in terms of their ownership dimension. After accounting for these changes, the final 
buyout-sample stands at 321 offerings. 
5.1.2 Event data – other IPOs 
To get a suitable benchmark against buyout-backed IPOs, SDC’s Global New Issues database is 
utilized. All public and private common stock listings in Nasdaq, NYSE or AMEX are retrieved for 
the same time period, including all the same data items as above, with the exception of owner-specific 
fields that are utilized only for buyout-backed offerings. These specifications form an initial sample 
of 4002 IPOs. This is edited by first removing duplicate offerings and the ones missing a CRSP ticker 
needed to get the aftermarket performance data. Moreover, to provide a better fitting benchmark 
sample, closed-end funds and investment trusts are removed from the sample. After also deducting 
the offerings that are found in the buyout-backed sample, the other IPOs sample amounts to 1700 
offerings. 
The whole IPO sample by year is illustrated in Table 3. Overall listing activity appears highest around 
the tech bubble of 1999-2000, also in terms of average market capitalization of offerings. Coolest 
IPO periods then seem to sync with stock market crises, being after the tech bubble years, as well as 
credit crunch of 2008. However, for buyout-IPOs bubble period was relatively quiet in terms of 
issuing volume, whereas the activity peaked in the period of 2004-2006 with a total volume of 150 
buyout-backed offerings. On average, buyout listings appear 26 percent larger in terms of market 
capitalization.  
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Table 3. Annual distribution of IPOs by number and average market value 
The total sample consists of 1700 non-backed (NB) and 321 buyout-backed (BO) IPOs floated from April 1996 
to Dec 2008. Average market value is the offer price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding right after 
the IPO. 
 Number of IPOs  Average market value ($m) 
 ALL NB BO  ALL NB BO 
1996 295 289 6  211 205 529 
1997 296 272 24  260 231 590 
1998 169 153 16  405 355 888 
1999 322 296 26  1,124 1176 526 
2000 256 240 16  1,387 1395 1268 
2001 52 41 11  1,388 1470 1086 
2002 55 39 16  554 458 787 
2003 53 32 21  695 386 1167 
2004 145 104 41  685 689 675 
2005 121 65 56  582 413 779 
2006 121 73 48  700 528 961 
2007 118 84 34  889 730 1282 
2008 18 12 6  1,977 2564 803 
Total 2021 1700 321  722 693 874 
 
5.1.3 Stock market and accounting items 
CRSP database offers historical stock market data for US-based companies, and is utilized in this 
research to provide data for comparing the performance of different IPOs. Daily share prices for 36 
months after offering are retained for companies in both IPO samples. To allow value weighting of 
IPO returns, also market capitalization at time of each issue are retrieved. 
Accounting data is needed to determine sources of out- or underperformance. Compustat is utilized 
in retrieving sales and EBITDA figures, total debt, total assets and book equity values on quarterly 
basis. Additionally, annual net operating assets are needed to study the impact of earnings quality. 
The main accounting, stock market and issue-specific data items are described in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Data items utilized in the study 
This table describes the main data items and their respective sources that are utilized in this study for each IPO stock. 
 
Data item Specification Source 
Share price in USD, daily time series CRSP 
Market capitalization in million USD, at the time of listing SDC 
Book value of equity in million USD, at the time of listing Compustat 
Net sales in million USD, quarterly Compustat 
EBITDA in million USD, quarterly Compustat 
Total assets in million USD, quarterly Compustat 
Total debt in million USD, quarterly Compustat 
Net operating assets12 in million USD, annual Compustat 
PE ownership stake in %, pre- and post-IPO SEC / EDGAR 
Date of PE investment in date SDC and SEC / EDGAR 
Private equity firm fund size in million USD SDC VentureXpert 
 
5.1.4 Other (benchmark) data 
To allow comparison of returns against different benchmarks, I also obtain monthly values on S&P 
500 and Nasdaq Composite indices. These are retained from CRSP. Additionally, the control firm 
sample (see 5.2.2) needs to be formed. CRSP database provides monthly returns and CUSIP and SIC 
codes for all American companies. Additionally, quarterly total asset values and price-to-book equity 
values for these companies are taken from Compustat to form the basis of matching sample companies 
with control firms. 
5.2 Measurement of abnormal performance 
Barber and Lyon (1997) study empirical power and specification of test statistics in the context of 
measuring long-term stock returns, and report that studies generally suffer from four issues: 1) 
measurement, 2) skewness, 3) new listing, and 4) rebalancing biases. Measurement bias is related to 
the choice of return calculation while skewness bias is an issue of choosing appropriate test statistics. 
These both are discussed in section 5.2.1. The other two biases are related to appropriate 
benchmarking, and are presented in 5.2.2. 
                                                 
12 Net operating assets = [common equity + preferred stock – preferred dividends] + [current debt + long-term debt - 
preferred stock + preferred dividends] + [cash and equivalents + investments and advances] + minority interest 
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Overall, returns are calculated for periods of twelve, twenty-four and thirty-six months to find out 
possible differences in persistence of out- or underperformance among the IPO subsamples. Both 
equal- and value-weighted measures are used to offer more insight on relative success of larger 
listings in each of the studied samples. Value-weighting is based on market values at offer of each 
IPO. 
5.2.1 Buy-and-hold returns 
Measurement bias is associated with the usage of cumulative abnormal returns - since they ignore 
compounding, the estimates for long-run returns will be positively biased. Consequently, this problem 
can be easily solved by using buy-and-hold-returns to gain less biased test statistics. 
Each IPO is calculated its specific buy-and-hold return by compounding its monthly returns in 
addition to the first fractional month of trading. The aftermarket performance of each IPO is then 
calculated by deducting the corresponding benchmark return over same time period. This measure 
then yields the buy-and-hold abnormal return for each offering, after which they are summed to get 
a portfolio level measure of abnormal returns. When a company is delisted from the portfolio, the 
next month’s portfolio return is simply the average of remaining stocks. Equation 1 below presents 
the process of calculating buy-and-hold abnormal returns for each IPO sample: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 =  
1
𝑁
∑ [(∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 ) −  (∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 )],
𝑁
𝑖=1   (1) 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑏𝑡 are the raw returns on IPO i and benchmark b at event month t.  
Skewness bias arises from long-term stock returns being positively skewed. Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 
(1999) suggest mitigating this problem through employing bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic 
instead of the conventional one. Specifications for calculating this more advanced t-statistic are 
shown below in equation 2: 
𝑡𝑠𝑎 =  √𝑛 (𝑆 + 
1
3
𝛾𝑆2 +  
1
6𝑛
?̂?),    (2) 
where 
𝑆 =
𝐴𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝜎(𝐴𝑅𝑡)
, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾 =
∑ (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡)
3𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛𝜎(𝐴𝑅𝑡)3
, 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for IPO i at event month t, 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 is the sample mean 
and 𝜎(𝐴𝑅𝑡) the sample standard deviation of abnormal returns. 
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The null hypothesis is that the mean abnormal return in the corresponding IPO portfolio equals zero. 
Significantly positive t-statistic indicates that portfolio of stocks has improved abnormally better than 
its benchmark, and vice versa for negative t-statistic. 
5.2.2 Benchmark portfolios 
In this study abnormal buy-and-hold returns are calculated against following three benchmarks: 
1) S&P 500 Index, 
2) Nasdaq Composite Index and 
3) control firms. 
While not necessarily having many similarities as buyout-backed IPOs, S&P 500 Index provides a 
fine overall index to analyze these IPOs as an investment – in comparison to general stock market 
development. Nasdaq Composite is used as another benchmark due to it being more comprised of 
growth stocks that should be better comparable to IPO stocks. 
However, these first two proposed benchmarks might differ quite strongly from the population of 
normal or buyout-backed IPOs, and hence not provide appropriate results as benchmarks. In fact, the 
IPOs might suffer from new listing and rebalancing bias. New listing bias is a problem in IPO event 
studies, since the newly-listed companies do not have similar history of past stock prices as the 
benchmark might have. Rebalancing bias arises from sample firms’ returns being compounded 
without rebalancing while in case of indices usually monthly rebalancing occurs. 
These issues can be mitigated by employing an approach called control firms, suggested by Barber 
and Lyon (1997). In control firms, the reference portfolio is compiled of similar stocks as in the 
studied population. This means that all sample firms are matched to a control firm that shares certain 
firm characteristics. Rebalancing issues disappear since the returns of both the sample and control 
firm are calculated without rebalancing measures. Since the focus of this study is to compare IPO 
performance both between different types of IPOs, and to other asset classes, the new listing bias is 
left unsolved on purpose.  
Sample firms are matched to control firms on three characteristics. First condition is that control firm 
must share the same primary industry, as measured by four-digit SIC codes. Hence a shortlist of 
comparables is chosen from control firms whose first two digits of SIC code are same as for a given 
sample firm. Secondly, size matching is done by filtering shortlist of control companies that have 
total assets values between 70% and 130% of the sample firm. Finally, to also get “style-matching” 
control company is chosen such as having the closest price-to-book equity to the sample company. 
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5.2.3 Operating performance 
Differences in operating performance between buyout- and non-backed IPO subsamples are studied 
for asset turnover (sales to total assets), operating margin (EBITDA to total sales) and leverage (total 
debt to total assets) for one year prior to offering to three years after the event.  IPO event year has 
been left out of this comparison on purpose to allow for comparison of performance in a wholly 
private and public setting. Median differences in two sample setting can be studied via Mann–
Whitney–Wilcoxon test (MWW) presented first by Mann and Whitney (1947). The Mann–Whitney–
Wilcoxon is a non-parametric test for the null hypothesis of two populations being the same. 
The observations in the whole sample are first made into single ranked series from smallest to largest 
performance indicator value, after which the ranks for each subsample are summed to form R1 and 
R2. The MWW-test statistic U is given by  
 
𝑈1 =  𝑅1 −  
𝑛1(𝑛1+1)
2
,      (3) 
 
where n1 is the sample size for sample 1 and R1 is the sum of ranks in sample 1. This U-statistic is 
then standardized by deducting the sample mean sum of ranks and dividing by corresponding 
standard deviation to study the statistical significance of differences in subsample value rankings. 
5.3 Drivers of (abnormal) performance 
The stock market performance of buyout-backed IPOs can be driven by their initial valuation in 
comparison to investors’ expectations, or the characteristics of these IPOs. The explanatory power of 
these drivers is evaluated in separate multivariate regressions, where dependent variable is the 
logarithm of equally-weighted twelve-month wealth relative. The wealth relatives are calculated by 
dividing the buy-and-hold returns of each IPO in samples with the corresponding returns of S&P 500 
index. These regressions are initially employed jointly for all IPOs to get an overall picture on the 
relevancy of factors, and then separately for buyout-backed and non-backed subsamples. 
In first set of regressions, the wealth relative is regressed by variables representing IPO characteristics 
at the time of offering: 
WR12 = α + β1 FirstRet + β2 MCAP + β3 BP + β4 Bubble + β5 PEbacked  (4) 
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The second regression introduces the operative drivers, and stands as follows: 
WR12 = α + β1 FirstRet + β2 MCAP + β3 BP + β4 Bubble + β5 PEbacked + β6 ATO + β7LEV (5) 
 
The third regression type is applicable only for the subsample of buyout-backed IPOs: 
WR12 = α + β1 FirstRet + β2 MCAP + β3 BP + β4 Bubble + β5 PEbacked + β6 ATO + β7LEV + β8OS 
+ β9REP+ β10Length + β11GNOA     (6) 
 
The explanatory variables and their expected impact on IPO stock’s performance are summarized in 
Table 5. The first group of variables represent IPO characteristics at the time of offering and are 
utilized in regressions for the whole sample. First day return is calculated by dividing the first day 
closing price with the initial offer price, and represents the underpricing of an issue. High 
underpricing is expected to have a negative impact on stock’s development due to the notion that the 
high price levels emerging after first, often optimistic trading day are unsustainable (Purnanandam 
and Swaminathan, 2004). 
Market capitalization is used as a proxy for company size and due to identified issues (Ritter and 
Welch, 2002) in performance of small stocks, market capitalization is expected to reflect in positive 
aftermarket performance. Likewise, higher book-to-price ratio is predicted to impact positively on 
stock, taking into account the risks associated with new listings that are strongly based on the 
intangible (and hence have lower B/P ratios). Also, timing of issue is considered in Bubble period 
dummy for those that have been listed during the high investor sentiment between July 1999 and June 
2000. With the inflated growth prospects associated with many of issues during the tech bubble time, 
such companies’ difficulties in meeting the inflated targets should reflect negatively on stock price 
development. 
Second set of variables for the whole sample include items of more operative nature. Asset turnover, 
i.e. sales to total assets, measures the operational efficiency of a given company. A better turnover 
ratio should result also in good share performance with company utilizing its assets more efficiently. 
Leverage’s impact cannot be predicted as straightforwardly as for others. On the other hand the 
controlling effects of debt financing should result in good investment decisions, mitigating the free 
cash flow problem. However, high debt levels also might put companies under financial distress and 
restrict in pursuing growth.  
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Table 5. Explanatory variables used to explain IPOs’ aftermarket performance 
This table describes the main explanatory variables used to explain the aftermarket performance of each IPO. Also the 
impact that each variable is expected to have on stock’s performance is specified. 
 
Offering characteristics variables Description Exp.  sign 
First-day return 
(FirstRet) 
Logarithm of the stock’s first day return 
 
- 
Market capitalization 
(MCAP) 
Logarithm of market capitalization at the time of the offer 
 
+ 
Book-to-price 
(BP) 
Ratio of book equity divided by market equity at the time of the 
offer 
 
+ 
Bubble period dummy 
(Bubble) 
Dummy for stocks issued during the tech bubble period (July 
1999 – June 2000) 
 
- 
Operating characteristics variables Description Exp.  sign 
Asset turnover 
(ATO) 
Ratio of sales divided by total assets at the fiscal year of the 
IPO 
 
+ 
Leverage 
(LEV) 
Ratio of total debt divided by total assets at the fiscal year of the 
IPO 
 
+/- 
Growth of net operating assets 
(GNOA) 
Percentage change in net operating assets from the year before 
IPO 
 
- 
Buyout-specific variables Description Exp.  sign 
PE dummy 
(PEbacked) 
Dummy for company being owned by a buyout firm 
 
+ 
PE ownership after IPO 
(OS) 
Proportion of shares held by the buyout firms after the IPO + 
PE firm reputation 
(REP) 
Logarithm of buyout firm’s assets under management ($m) + 
Length of investment 
(Length) 
Logarithm of the days that company was in buyout firm’s 
portfolio before IPO 
+ 
 
Additionally, since the focus is on the drivers of buyout-backed IPO performance, four variables are 
studied only for the subsample of buyout-backed IPOs. Firstly, as the second hypothesis suggests, the 
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size of buyout firm’s ownership is expected to improve stock’s performance due to concentrated 
owner continuing to engage actively in value creation also after the issue. Likewise, more reputable 
PE houses (hypothesis 3) are predicted to deliver better performance due to their potential abilities of 
winner-picking, better monitoring and access to higher quality underwriters. In a similar fashion to 
Cao and Lerner (2009) or Tykvova and Walz (2007), reputation is proxied by Private Equity firms’ 
assets under management. Unfortunately this reputation measure needs to be estimated from latest 
figures of assets under management due to limitations of historical data on SDC database. 
Additionally, in line with fourth hypothesis, the length of buyout firm involvement in improving their 
portfolio company is one driver expected to spur better stock market performance. 
Also, another operative metric used for buyout-backed IPOs is growth in net operating assets (NOA), 
reflecting on earnings quality of issuing company. Rapidly growing NOA might imply earnings 
manipulation prior to listing in order to spur investor demand, and should hence have a negative 
impact on stock’s performance once the inflated expectations based on manipulated financial 
performance are not reached. 
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6 Results and analysis 
This section presents and discusses the empirical results of this study. The buyout- and non-backed 
subsamples are first described on the basis of differences in key comparative statistics. Secondly, the 
aftermarket performance of each IPO group is analyzed over different time periods and against 
different benchmarks. Finally, the significance of various drivers are analyzed with multivariate 
cross-sectional regressions.  
6.1 Comparative statistics 
Table 6 shows the summary statistics for samples of non-backed and buyout-backed IPOs. 
Comparisons have been done by calculating the median values for each operational characteristic, 
and these are shown on the panel A of the table below. The buyout firms’ focus on more mature, 
established companies is well illustrated in companies floated by them having market capitalization 
double the size of others at over 500 M$. Likewise, their portfolio companies are almost ten-fold in 
terms of total assets and net sales in comparison to non-backed IPO companies. 
Buyout-backed IPO companies appear also significantly more profitable at the time of listing with 
median EBITDA-margins at 14 percent in comparison to other IPOs 5.5 percent margins. Buyout-
backed IPOs are also able to utilize their assets more efficiently to generate revenue with median 
asset turnover ratios around 80 percent. The often recognized characteristic of buyout companies 
utilizing aggressive leverage also holds for this sample. Whereas non-backed issuing companies have 
a debt ratio of 23 percent, for buyout-driven listings the comparable figure stands almost at 54 percent. 
Panel B gives an overview of buyout-specific offer characteristics. Average buyout firm has invested 
in the listing company almost five years prior to offering. The early described feature of buyout firms 
willing to take majority share in their portfolio companies holds well for this sample. Average 
ownership stake of buyout sponsor(s) stands at 64 percent prior to offering. Also, sponsors’ exit in 
IPO is often partial as confirmed by the median post-IPO ownership stake of 43 percent. 
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Table 6. Summary statistics for each IPO group 
This table illustrates comparative statistics for the samples of 1700 non-backed (NB) and 321 buyout-backed (BO) 
issues. Operational figures are presented in panel A, whereas panel B contains metrics on involvement of buyout firms. 
Due to data availability the sample sizes differ for each operational measure. 
 
Panel A. Operational characteristics 
  NB BO 
Market capitalization ($m) Median 251 511 
 No. obs. (1700) (321) 
Total assets ($m) Median 32 329 
 No. obs. (1414) (314) 
Net sales ($m) Median 28 259 
 No. obs. (1397) (303) 
EBITDA margin (%) Median 5.5 % 14.1 % 
 No. obs. (1323) (295) 
Asset turnover Median 0.6 0.8 
 No. obs. (1301) (288) 
Total debt to total assets Median 23.0 % 53.7 % 
 No. obs. (1185) (300) 
Price-to-book Median 3.8 3.4 
 No. obs. (1485) (316) 
Panel B: Buyout involvement 
Number of years of private equity group 
investment before IPO 
Mean N/A 4.8 
Median  3.2 
 No. obs.  (321) 
Private equity group ownership before IPO 
(%) 
Mean N/A 64.1 % 
Median  68.3 % 
 No. obs.  (321) 
Private equity group ownership after IPO 
(%) 
Mean N/A 42.7 % 
Median  42.6 % 
 No. obs.  (321) 
 
  
37 
 
Summary statistics regarding first-day returns for the whole sample and two separate IPO groups are 
presented in Table 7 below. The average return between April 1996 and December 2008 stood rather 
high at 29.3% but the significantly lower median returns indicate large deviations within the sample 
returns. Furthermore, the booming effect of the internet-stock bubble is evident on studying these 
first-day returns, since the comparable average return for stock issued between summer 1999 and 
summer 2000 stood at 76%. 
Table 7. First-day returns for IPO groups 
This table show the equal-weighted first-day percentage returns for the whole sample of IPOs (ALL), as well as for 
non-backed (NB) and buyout-backed (BO) subsamples on AMEX, NYSE and Nasdaq between April 1996 and 
December 2008. Bubble period extends from July 1999 to June 2000.  
 
 ALL NB BO 
Average (%) 29.3 % 33.0 % 9.6 % 
Median (%) 12.2 % 12.5 % 3.5 % 
Normal period average (%) 19.8 % 22.0 % 9.6 % 
Bubble period average (%) 76.0 % 80.8 % 8.7 % 
Standard deviation (%) 60.5 % 62.8 % 40.5 % 
Total number of issues 2,021 1,700 321 
 
Buyout-backed IPOs show clear differences to non-backed issues in terms of first day returns, with 
average first-day returns below ten percent. The difference is especially striking in terms of offerings 
during the bubble period. Where buyout-backed issues provided similar returns as in normal period, 
the average return on non-backed issues’ was at 80.8%. This and also the low number of buyout-
backed IPOs as witnessed in table 3 might indicate PE houses not trying to capitalize on the hot 
market conditions in order to protect their much-needed reputation as witnessed by Bergström et al. 
(2006). Overall, the picture emerging from the marked differences in underpricing might reflect on 
lower risk associated with buyout- driven stock as well as the PE houses’ quality stamp (Cao and 
Lerner, 2009). 
6.2 Long-run aftermarket performance 
The buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for the whole IPO sample are presented in Table 8. 
Results have been reported for 12-, 24- and 36-month periods of each subsample, as well as the whole 
IPO sample using three different benchmarks: 1) S&P500 Index, 2) Nasdaq Composite Index and 3) 
Control firms, as described in section 5.2.2. Due to companies delisting, bankruptcies and M&A 
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activities, the amount of IPOs included in calculation decreases over time, with 78% of sample 
companies having available stock price data for the whole three years. 
The results for the entire sample are in line with previous literature (Ritter, 1991, Loughran and Ritter, 
1995, Carter, Dark and Singh, 1998) with negative BHARs for the whole 3-year period in comparison 
to the overall stock market proxy of S&P500 index. The underperformance appears especially 
significant for first 24 months, with IPOs trading at 10 percent below the S&P benchmark. 
The results for the whole sample seem to be mostly driven by poor performance of non-backed issues. 
In comparison, the buyout-backed offerings show evidence of statistically significant outperformance 
during the first 12 trading months, supporting the findings of Levis (2011). However, this 
outperformance over the benchmark index does not persist for the whole period with buyout-
offerings’ BHARs being statistically indifferent from zero for two- and three-year periods. Still, they 
do outperform the non-backed offerings despite negative performance against the stock market 
benchmark, as documented also by Bergström et al. (2006). 
In comparison to Nasdaq composite as benchmark, the underperfomance phenomenon of all IPOs is 
more strongly evident. BHARs are statistically significant for all intervals and the underperfomance 
is increasing over time, reaching -22 percent in year three. In line with S&P500 comparison, buyout-
backed offerings outperform also Nasdaq for the first twelve months but for 24- and 36-month 
timeframes the drop in returns shows a significant underperformance. 
Control firms benchmark is used in the study to provide a “fair” comparable from existing stocks to 
each listing company. With each control firm - IPO firm pair having similar characteristics in terms 
of industry, size and style, the comparison implicitly excludes the effects of company size or industry 
focus on the stock market performance. Against this benchmark the BHAR results for the sample 
appear very interesting in that the evidence for underperforming IPO stock disappears against control 
firms. On the contrary, especially non-backed offerings seem to enjoy superior aftermarket 
performance in the 2- and 3-year timeframe while buyout-backed offerings returns do not statistically 
differ from zero. It might be that the buyout-backed IPOs benefit in aftermarket also from their larger 
size and more stable cash flows (see sample characteristics in Table 6) – the benefit of which 
disappears when matching with roughly comparable companies. 
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Table 8. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
This table shows the 12-, 24- and 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns in percentage terms against 
three alternative benchmarks: 1) S&P500 Index, 2) Nasdaq Composite Index and 3) Control firms. Returns 
have been calculated on both equal- and value weighted basis. Returns for all sample IPOs are portrayed in 
Panel A, while Panel B shows NB-sample results and Panel C for the BO-backed offerings. The 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Months Equal weighted  Value weighted 
 S&P500 NASDAQ CONTROL  S&P500 NASDAQ CONTROL 
Panel A. All IPOs 
12 -3.01 -4.58* -1.31  -3.58 -0.74 -15.21*** 
 (-1.19) (-1.83) (-0.40)  (-0.67) (-0.16) (-3.44) 
24 -10.03** -15.94*** 11.54***  -12.66** -6.37 -10.69* 
 (-2.41) (-3.59) (3.12)  (-2.26) (-1.45) (-2.48) 
36 -5.99 -22.32*** 16.10***  -7.61 -5.66 -3.19 
 (-1.03) (-2.92) (3.33)  (-1.38) (-1.21) (-0.71) 
Panel B. Non-Buyout Backed IPOs 
12 -5.57* -6.73** -3.77  -5.84 -1.59 -19.13*** 
 (-1.86) (-2.28) (-1.00)  (-0.89) (-0.29) (-3.51) 
24 -11.26** -16.47*** 14.05***  -13.75* -3.93 -10.48 
 (-2.30) (-3.21) (3.34)  (-2.00) (-0.74) (-2.00) 
36 -6.73 -24.06*** 19.25***  -8.57 -3.43 -1.93 
 (-0.97) (-2.71) (3.44)  (-1.27) (-0.61) (-0.35) 
Panel C. Buyout Backed IPOs 
12 10.35*** 6.67* 12.60**  5.74 2.75 2.94 
 (2.91) (1.82) (2.67)  (1.62) (0.78) (0.90) 
24 -3.78 -13.22*** -2.41  -8.16* -16.49*** -11.72** 
 (-0.93) (-3.00) (-0.41)  (-2.08) (-3.59) (-2.73) 
36 -2.45 -13.95** -0.64  -3.78 -14.56** -9.19 
 (-0.46) (-2.47) (-0.09)  (-0.73) (-2.54) (-1.73) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level 
*     Significant at the 0.10 level 
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Studying the value-weighted returns as shown on the right hand side of Table 8 provide more  
suggestions on the impact of size on the performance of IPO stock. The BHARs for buyout-backed 
IPOs do not show evidence of outperformance anymore, which implies that the largest issues have 
performed poorer than the smaller ones in that subsample. For the non-backed issues the value-
weighting shows similar level of underperformance as for equal-weighted calculations, indicating 
that winners and losers are spread equally across all sizes within the sample. 
Table 9 shows interesting patterns on how buy-and-hold abnormal returns have fluctuated across 
sample years between 1996 and 2008. For the whole IPO sample, years 1996-1997 and dotcom-
bubble year of 2000 seem to have been poor for aftermarket development of stock performance. 
However, these difficulties have not always reflected on the buyout-backed offerings, which managed 
to outperform the benchmark in 1996 by 33% on average, and to match benchmark index’s 
development in the troublesome tech bubble year of 2000. Consequently, buyout-backed offerings 
have underperformed the S&P500 index only three years out of thirteen. 2008 is one year with such 
below par performance, indicating that the buyout-backed IPOs have not managed to deliver in those 
distressed credit crunch years. However, the volume of such IPOs launched in 2007-2008 is very 
small so reliable conclusions on their performance during the financial crisis years cannot be drawn, 
except for the low volume indicating PE sponsors willingness to avoid listing during distressed 
market years. Overall, these findings reflect that buyout-offerings good performance is not due to a 
successful market timing of a few “hit” years but a rather continuous phenomenon. 
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Table 9. 12-month BHARs (S&P benchmark) by issue year 
This table shows the division of buy-and-hold abnormal returns for all sample IPOs as well as non-backed 
(NB) and buyout-backed (BO) IPOs. The returns are calculated by compounding monthly returns for 12 
months against the S&P500 as benchmark.  
 
 Equal Weighted  Value Weighted 
 ALL NB BO  ALL NB BO 
1996 -21 % -22 % 33 %  -25 % -27 % 15 % 
1997 -18 % -17 % -30 %  -12 % -11 % -17 % 
1998 5 % 4 % 17 %  42 % 42 % 39 % 
1999 21 % 20 % 28 %  11 % 11 % 5 % 
2000 -32 % -34 % 0 %  -46 % -48 % -19 % 
2001 4 % -5 % 39 %  16 % 9 % 50 % 
2002 16 % 18 % 11 %  8 % 8 % 8 % 
2003 3 % 12 % -10 %  2 % 19 % -7 % 
2004 14 % 10 % 24 %  11 % 9 % 17 % 
2005 19 % 10 % 28 %  23 % 29 % 19 % 
2006 11 % 18 % 0 %  28 % 58 % 3 % 
2007 -4 % -5 % 0 %  -4 % -1 % -8 % 
2008 4 % 18 % -21 %  20 % 26 % -19 % 
 
6.3 Drivers of aftermarket performance 
Sample characteristics and BHAR results indicate that buyout-backed offerings are typically priced 
more prudently (lower underpricing), are significantly larger (in terms of revenue, market 
capitalization and assets), more profitable, and less growth driven (lower P/B ratio). Furthermore, 
they seem to outperform their counterparts in the aftermarket, especially during the first 12 months. 
To better understand the causes of this aftermarket performance, Table 10 illustrates the median 
operating performance from one year prior to issue to three years after the issue. Operating 
performance is studied in terms of asset turnover, operating margin and leverage, and the sample 
differences are evaluated using Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test statistic as explained in section 5.2.3. 
Consistent with observations in previous literature (Jain and Kini, 1994), the operating performance 
of non-backed offerings seems to deteriorate quite heavily after IPO. In this study the decreased 
performance is attributable to of asset turnover, whereas their profitability stays roughly on same 
level. However, as findings by Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997) support, the drop in performance 
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is severe only for the first year post-IPO, after which return to pre-IPO levels starts to happen at a 
modest pace.  
Table 10. Operating performance before and after IPO 
Table reports median asset turnover, operating margin and leverage ratios for each non-backed (NB) and buyout-
backed (BO) IPO for one year before and three years after the offering. Due to data availability buyout-backed sample 
consists of 300 IPOs and non-backed sample of 1329 IPOs. Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test (MWW) values test for 
median differences across two IPO subsamples. 
 
 t – 1 t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 
Panel A: Asset Turnover (Sales to Total Assets), % 
NB 97.1 61.2 65.9 70.4 
BO 87.3 78.2 86.2 89.7 
MWW 196946 153180*** 128709*** 106321*** 
Panel B: Operating Margin (EBITDA to Sales), % 
NB 5.5 6.9 5.4 6.2 
BO 14.1 15.5 14.2 14.6 
MWW 119900*** 113920*** 100443*** 82157*** 
Panel C: Leverage (Total Debt to Total Assets), % 
NB 23.0 7.5 9.9 13.5 
BO 53.7 34.8 34.9 35.0 
MWW 104880*** 75885*** 69694*** 57796*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level 
*     Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
In line with research by Holthausen and Larcker (1996), buyout-backed IPOs suffer a similar drop to 
non-backed ones but not of same magnitude. However, they show the ability to lift the asset turnover 
ratios above pre-listing level quite rapidly. This pattern is also witnessed in leverage ratios – both 
groups naturally experience an influx of equity at the IPO but the buyout-backed ones continue to 
keep their balance sheets rather debt-laden to enjoy the controlling benefits of debt financing.  
Key observation in the table is however the statistically significant difference in performance levels 
– the buyout-backed IPOs are able to generate more sales on their asset base, and do it more profitably. 
This persistence in operating performance might well explain the differences in stock market 
performance between the two samples. Whereas investors might be positively surprised by the 
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buyout-backed companies’ ability to continue and even improve their good performance in the public 
market, the decreasing performance levels of non-backed companies contradicts with their higher 
initial valuations and results in poorer aftermarket stock development. 
In addition to the persistence of good operating performance, the positive aftermarket performance 
of buyout-backed IPOs can be driven by typical characteristics of such IPOs and their initial 
valuations versus investor expectations. Table 11 reports the regression results for the whole IPO 
sample as well as non-backed and buyout-backed subsamples. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of an equally-weighted 12-month wealth relative versus the S&P500 benchmark, calculated 
by dividing IPO-specific buy-and-hold returns with S&P500 returns for the same period. Different 
regressions are based on grouping of independent variables’ type. First regressions for each sample 
(1, 3 and 5 in table below) account for offering characteristics at the time of offer, i.e. the first-day 
return, market capitalization, book-to-price and dotcom-bubble dummy. Second set of regressions (2, 
4 and 6) contains variables of more operative nature: asset turnover and leverage for the first year 
after the IPO event. The seventh regression applies only for buyout-backed offerings, and contains 
variables that reflect not on the IPO per se, but rather on type of their majority owner and its actions 
around the IPO event. 
The first and second columns show a significantly positive effect on the Private Equity dummy 
variable, reflecting on the outperformance of buyout-backed offerings in the aftermarket as illustrated 
earlier in Section 6.2. For the first-day return, the coefficient stands negative and statistically 
significant across all regressions. This implies that the rather optimistic initial price levels after first 
trading day appear untenable and result in aftermarket underperformance for IPOs. 
Impact of market capitalization on aftermarket performance is positive across all regressions, 
illustrating that larger issues have done better for both non-backed and buyout-backed offerings. 
Similarly, high book-to-price ratio has a significant positive effect on stock’s performance for non-
backed IPOs, for buyout-backed ones the positive relation of B/P ratio does not hold that strongly. 
This is consistent with the findings by Ritter and Welch (2002), who have shown that smaller and 
more growth-driven companies (low book-to-price), such as typical IPOs, underperform against 
larger and more stable comparables. Dotcom-bubble’s impact on stock performance is as expected, 
with the dummy variable having negative and statistically significant impact across all regressions. 
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Table 11. Multivariate cross-sectional regressions of 12-month aftermarket performance 
This table reports the results for 7 separate multivariate regressions for all IPOs (ALL), non-backed issues (NB) and 
buyout-backed issues (BO) specifically. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of a wealth relative with the 
S&P500 benchmark. The independent variables have been explained thoroughly in section 5.3. The number of 
observations varies across regressions due to data availability reasons. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 ALL  NB  BO 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
First-day return -0.084** -0.101***  -0.121*** -0.150***  -0.198*** -0.223*** -0.244*** 
 (-2.57) (-2.88)  (-3.08) (-3.47)  (-3.69) (-4.16) (-4.80) 
Market capitalization 0.025*** 0.024**  0.033*** 0.031***  0.094*** 0.105*** 0.130*** 
 (2.82) (2.49)  (3.28) (2.92)  (4.52) (4.96) (6.19) 
Book-to-price 0.044** 0.050**  0.045** 0.051**  0.072 0.049 0.035 
 (2.25) (2.45)  (2.14) (2.30)  (1.31) (0.87) (0.66) 
Bubble period dummy -0.110*** -0.137***  -0.113*** -0.134***  -0.222*** -0.236*** -0.206*** 
(-4.27) (-4.93)  (-3.95) (-4.31)  (-3.69) (-3.74) (-3.41) 
Asset turnover  0.024   0.020   0.022 0.040 
  (1.26)   (0.94)   (0.61) (1.14) 
Leverage  0.022***   0.019***   0.019* 0.019* 
  (4.21)   (3.17)   (1.86) (1.92) 
PE ownership after 
IPO 
        0.018 
        (0.27) 
Length of investment         0.067*** 
        (4.20) 
PE firm reputation         0.023** 
         (2.27) 
Growth of net 
operating assets 
        -0.073* 
        (-1.89) 
PE dummy 0.049* 0.073***        
 (1.95) (2.80)        
Intercept 0.478*** 0.400***  0.446*** 0.381***  0.096 -0.018 -0.476** 
 (9.62) (7.29)  (8.20) (6.26)  (0.73) (-0.13) (-2.46) 
R2 0.04 0.06  0.04 0.05  0.14 0.17 0.24 
No. of observations (1508) (1268)  (1230) (1007)  (278) (261) (261) 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level 
*     Significant at the 0.10 level 
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Of the operative variables, the asset turnover ratio reported in regressions 2, 4, 6 and 7 does not seem 
to explain IPOs’ performance strongly. The better the company can generate sales on their asset base 
has a positive effect on share price development but the results are not significant on 10 percent level. 
Leverage on the other hand appears as a significant driver for positive aftermarket performance across 
both IPO groups. This finding is aligned with benefits of debt financing in mitigating the free cash 
flow problem as suggested by Jensen (1986), and provides support regarding the LBO model being a 
key value generation driver for buyout-backed offerings. 
Of the private equity –specific variables, the stake of major owner immediately after the offering does 
not appear significant as a performance driver. It might be that PE houses continue their active, value-
creating ownership after IPO regardless the amount of their ownership share, since they still often 
continue to have a major interest in the post-IPO performance of their investment due to lock-up 
agreements and reputational concerns. The length of PE investment has a significant positive impact 
on the performance of buyout-backed IPOs. The finding that PE houses who take time to prepare 
their investments ready for stock listing enjoy better performance than more rapidly spun over 
companies is in line with Cao’s (2011) findings in the LBO setting. 
Reputation of the main private equity investor also bears significance in aftermarket performance. 
This might be due to their ability to deliver on different parts of PE value chain, from winner picking 
to active ownership and issue-specific factors like high-quality underwriters. The earnings quality 
proxy (growth in net operating assets) appears also of statistical significance in the regression with a 
negative coefficient, being consistent with Katz’s (2009) studies on earnings quality in private equity 
environment. The variable can be interpreted as a case of manipulating the growing net operating 
assets to lift earnings for the IPO, which is likely to result in poorer operating and consequently stock 
market performance when targets based on manipulated financials cannot be met. 
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7 Discussion and conclusions 
My thesis studies the aftermarket performance of non-backed and buyout-backed IPOs to provide 
insight regarding private equity’s involvement in the setting of initial public offerings. The topic is 
of interest due mixed academic evidence regarding whether buyout- or venture capital -backed IPOs 
manage to outperform non-backed IPOs and even the overall stock market. For measurement of 
outperformance, I leverage the buy-and-hold-abnormal returns methodology suggested by Barber and 
Lyon (1997) and utilized in similar studies by Cao and Lerner (2009) and Levis (2011) among others. 
The buy-and-hold-abnormal returns are compared against three differing benchmarks to give more 
insight on the performance differences. 
Second focus area is to gain better understanding on the drivers of stock market performance for 
initial public offerings. Current evidence on factors such as relationship between leverage and stock 
market performance appears two-fold, and my study gives more insight on the matter. Additionally, 
several buyout-specific drivers, namely private equity owners’ reputation, length of investment and 
size of ownership stake are analyzed via multivariate cross-sectional regressions on the wealth 
relative of a given IPO stock. 
The main findings of my research are discussed in this section in light of previous evidence on the 
field. I also suggest interesting and/or controversial topics around buyout-backed offerings that should 
be further studied to gain evidence on the drivers of such stocks’ performance. 
7.1 Outperformance of buyout-backed offerings 
The main findings of my study are summarized in Table 12, aligned with the five hypotheses 
presented in section 4. I find strong evidence on buyout-backed offerings outperforming both the non-
backed offerings as well as the overall stock market benchmark of S&P 500 in the first twelve months 
of trading, supporting previous work by Levis (2011, United Kingdom), Bergström et al. (2006, 
France and United Kingdom) and Cao and Lerner (2009, United States). However, the persistence of 
buyout offerings’ outperformance over the stock market does not hold for longer time periods, 
contrasting with findings of Levis (2011).  
Despite buyout-backed offerings inability to generate abnormal returns over overall stock market in 
the longer term, I find evidence that they do generate superior returns towards the non-backed 
offerings in a similar fashion to findings by Bergström et al. (2006). This result is consistent over all 
time periods, and also against Nasdaq Composite as the benchmark. Against the third benchmark, the 
industry-, size- and style-matched control firms the results appear most interesting. Buyout-IPOs 
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continue to outperform strongly during first twelve months but for 24- and 36-month periods they are 
significantly outperformed by the non-backed offerings. These findings shed light on the previously 
documented issues regarding the typical small and growth-driven IPOs (Ritter and Welch, 2002), 
with the benefits associated with larger and more stable IPOs disappearing for the buyout sample via 
control firms’ matching. 
To conclude, the overall pattern from the buy-and-hold-abnormal returns shows consistently buyout-
backed IPOs to outperform benchmarks and non-backed issues over the first trading year, with stock’s 
relative performance dropping in subsequent years. This pattern is in line with findings by Cao and 
Lerner (2009), who document RLBOs to sharply outperform the market in the first, fourth, and fifth 
year after going public, whereas performance for second and third year appears more ambiguous. It 
might be that the more conservatively priced buyout-offerings surprise the stock market with robust 
operational performance, exceeding the expectations set by initial pricing during first year. In 
subsequent years the buyout firms are more flexible in terms of exiting the investment after expiration 
of lockup periods, which might cause the performance to drop during second and third year of trading. 
This phenomenon is also supported by the evidence on the profitability of buyout-backed IPOs 
peaking in first year after issue. 
Table 12. Summary of key findings 
Hypothesis Empirical evidence Conclusion 
H1 Buyout-backed IPOs experience 
superior aftermarket 
performance in comparison to 
non-backed IPOs 
Buyout-backed IPOs outperform the benchmark with 
10.4 % BHAR in comparison to non-backed -5.6 % 
BHAR over first 12 months. Does not hold against all 
benchmarks or all time periods. 
Further research 
required to 
verify longer-
term relation. 
H2 Size of buyout-firm ownership 
after an IPO has a positive effect 
on stock’s performance 
Regressions show that PE sponsor(s) ownership share’s 
effect on stock’s performance is not statistically 
different from zero. 
Rejected 
H3 Buyout-firm reputation has a 
positive effect on stock’s 
performance 
Results of the regression show the reputation proxy of 
assets under management to have statistically 
significant positive relation to stock’s performance. 
Accepted 
H4 Length of buyout-firm 
involvement pre-IPO has a 
positive effect on stock’s 
performance 
Results of the regression show the length of buyout 
involvement to drive stock’s performance positively 
with statistical significance. 
Accepted 
H5 Better earnings quality has a 
positive effect on stock’s 
performance 
Earnings quality proxy of growth in net operating 
assets is associated with statistically significant 
negative impact on stock’s performance. 
Accepted
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7.2. Drivers of performance 
In testing the drivers of stock market performance for IPOs, I find significant results consistent with 
academic evidence across all IPO samples. Level of underpricing emerges with a significant negative 
coefficient, reflecting that the rather optimistic initial price levels after first trading day appear 
untenable, as proposed earlier in work by Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004). For the buyout 
sample the coefficient on underpricing appears strongest, indicating that the dynamics around the 
price setting process are a key driver in post-IPO performance. Market capitalization and book-to-
price yield results in line with work of Ritter and Welch (2002), implying outperformance for larger 
and more cash flow stable offerings. However, in buyout sample the B/P ratio does not appear as a 
significant driver, which might indicate that PE sponsors are able to deliver despite the nature of the 
portfolio company being leaned towards growth or value. 
Of most interest are the buyout-specific variables relating to my main research hypotheses. I find 
strong evidence for the acceptance of reputation hypothesis, supporting claims by Krishnan et al. 
(2011), in which sponsors with better reputation engage in more active corporate governance also 
after the IPO and can turn this activity into better long-term performance. In addition, reputational 
players’ connections to high quality underwriters (Brav and Gompers, 1997) and debtholders, as well 
as ability to pick winners and deliver improved operational performance via all private equity value 
creation levers are other possible explanations to this finding. This contrasts with study by Levis 
(2011), who reports no significance for the reputation in his United Kingdom -based sample. This 
might be driven by the more mature American private equity industry showing greater differences 
between best-of-the-business PE sponsors and others. 
Regression analysis shows that IPOs associated with longer private equity involvement do better than 
more quickly listed companies. This maturity of the issue has been shown to be significant in work 
by Cao (2011) but contrasts again with the UK-related findings of Levis (2011). These differing 
findings might indicate structural differences between these markets: U.S.-based samples might 
contain larger restructurings that take more time to prepare for listing, or they might be more eager 
to push IPOs quickly to the market during hot periods. I also find the earnings quality measure to be 
a significant driver for aftermarket performance, supporting the work of Katz (2009). With the tighter 
monitoring employed by private equity firms to protect their reputation at the market, the management 
can be expected to have less leeway to manage earnings upwards, resulting in more realistic forecasts 
and consequently the ability to meet or exceed the targets and valuations levels set by these targets. 
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Contrasting with work by Levis (2011), I find no evidence for the size of buyout sponsors’ ownership 
share after IPO to bear an impact on stock price development, rejecting the second hypothesis of my 
study. Explanation for this could be that the PE houses continue their active, value-creating ownership 
after IPO regardless the amount of their ownership share, since they often continue to have a major 
interest in the post-IPO performance of their investment due to lock-up agreements and reputational 
concerns. Consequently, the size of the ownership share might not matter as long as it does not 
disperse too much but rather than the company can employ the benefits of concentrated ownership as 
proposed by Holthausen and Larcker (1996). 
7.3. Avenues for further research 
To conclude, I have shown buyout-backed IPOs to outperform their non-backed peers over one, two 
and three years of aftermarket performance, depending on the benchmark used. The outperformance 
seems to be attributable to the role of private equity sponsors in the listing process via smaller 
underpricing levels and more realistic valuations achieved through better earnings quality. 
Additionally, I show that longer involvement and better owner reputation leads to better stock market 
performance due to private equity sponsors’ ability to utilize their active, controlling ownership in 
operational improvements, and continue to do so after the listing. 
As my study has provided insight on the relevance of different drivers on IPOs’ aftermarket 
performance, an interesting next step would be more thorough understanding of the given drivers. 
Hence future research could focus on the challenging aspect of analyzing the extent of private equity 
sponsors’ involvement and the consequences of their connections along the different PE-related value 
drivers. Such understanding might be impossible to come by via using the traditional empirical 
approaches of data analysis. Complementing the data with interviewing institutional investors, private 
equity partners and investment banks would provide valuable insight on top of the traditional data, 
especially on matters like underpricing and the importance of reputation. 
Research focus should also be put on better understanding the impact of concentrated ownership after 
the IPO event in private equity setting. As Levis (2011) shows this driver to be positive and significant 
for the post-IPO share price development, my analysis illustrates no significance for the matter. 
Understanding the boundaries of concentrated versus dispersed ownership in support of private equity 
value creation would be of great interest to reflect on when the agency cost –mitigating benefits are 
lost. 
Furthermore, as this study focuses solely on offers that have gone public, future research in this area 
could study the whole private equity exit process more thoroughly, analyzing the outcome of their 
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investments in more general fashion. Interviews, as mentioned earlier could provide an interesting 
dataset on understanding the relevant company characteristics and market circumstances, in which 
IPO is chosen as the exit channel over a sale to a financial or strategic buyer.  
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